Thirty years ago, when we were still using typewriters and fewer than 25 per cent of households invested in the stock market, economists conjectured that employees would work harder and make better decisions under a “pay-for-performance” system. This theory became popular in boardrooms – especially since it was an influential argument for increasing the pay of the chief executive and top officers. Bonuses tied to performance became standard practice in US companies and on Wall Street in particular.
30年前，当我们仍在使用打字机、投资股市的家庭不足25%的时候，经济学家揣测，通过“绩效工资”(pay-for-performance)制度，员工将更加努力，并做出更好的决策。这一理论迅速在各公司董事会流行起来——尤其是因为它为首席执行官及和其他高管加薪提供了重要依据。奖金与绩效挂钩，成为美国企业的标准做法，在华尔街更是如此。
But economics has not stood still, and we now know there are at least four reasons why bonuses and pay-for-performance are a risky business. First, it can be hard to see whether employees make the right decisions; superiors do not hold the same information, and the results of decisions play out years later. Second, performance pay will attract exactly those who are willing to take on more risk. People interested in high but steady income will choose other careers. Third, to get their pay, employees may manipulate the system, against the interests of those who set up the incentives: like teachers who are threatened with losing their jobs and teach to the test. Finally, and most perniciously, performance pay can crowd out intrinsic rewards, as when children, having received gold stars for drawing pictures, later draw less than before in their own time. Why draw without getting paid?
但是经济学家们并未就此止步。我们现在知道，至少有四个原因，说明施行奖金和绩效工资的做法存在风险。首先，很难判断员工是否作出了正确决策，上司不掌握相同的信息，而决策结果要在多年后才会显现。其次，绩效薪酬吸引的正是那些愿意冒更大风险的人，那些愿意选择稳定的高收入的人会选择其它职业。第三，为了获得高额薪酬，员工可能会操纵这种机制，违背机制创建者们的利益：正如面临失业威胁的教师目标就是为了考试成绩。最后、同时也最有害的一点是，绩效薪酬可能对“内在满足感”(intrinsic reward)产生挤出效应。例如，孩子因画画而获得了一朵小红花作为奖励，随后主动画的画就比以前少了。没有奖励为什么还要画画呢？