It’s always dangerous to declare victory in a war against inflation. But the surge in prices that started after Covid hit in 2020 and got fresh momentum from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has now very definitely moderated. The production line for postmortems of the great inflation and lessons for next time has been humming along for more than a year.
在对抗通货膨胀的战争中宣布胜利总是危险的。但在2020年新冠疫情爆发后开始、并在2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后获得了新动力的价格飙升，现在已经非常明确地放缓了。人们对大通胀进行事后分析和为下一次总结经验教训已有一年多。
Many focus on whether central banks were skilful or got lucky. But there are also morals for industrial and trade policy. The evidence suggests the case for widespread government intervention in a value chain just because it was under strain during the twin Covid-Ukraine crises remains weak.
许多人关注的焦点是，央行是有能力还是运气好。但工业和贸易政策也有教训可总结。有证据表明，仅仅因为价值链在新冠-乌克兰双重危机期间承受压力，政府就对其进行广泛干预的理由仍然薄弱。
First, let’s define exactly what we mean. Government value chain intervention can make sense in areas involving genuine security threats especially related to geopolitics. These include the supply of critical inputs and investing in high-end sensitive technology. But it’s more doubtful whether the everyday plumbing of world trade — ports, distribution centres, the manufacture of intermediate inputs — needs fixing.
首先，让我们确切地定义一下我们的意思。在涉及真正安全威胁的领域，特别是与地缘政治有关的领域，政府对价值链的干预是合理的。这些领域包括关键投入品供应和高端敏感技术投资。但更值得怀疑的是，世界贸易的日常管道——港口、配送中心、中间投入品的制造——是否需要干预。
Conclusions about the causes of the great inflation are highly sensitive to how you set the model up. But there are some agreed salient features. One, a massive Covid-related surge in consumer demand, particularly for durable goods, driving their prices higher. Two, graphic examples of supply chain problems, including congestion in US ports and shortages of semiconductors. Three, energy and food price shocks after the Ukraine invasion, particularly in Europe.
关于大通胀原因的结论对你如何建立模型非常敏感。但也有一些公认的显著因素。其一，与新冠疫情相关的消费者需求大幅飙升，尤其是对耐用品的需求，推高了它们的价格。二是一些生动说明供应链问题的例子，包括美国港口拥堵和半导体短缺。三是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后的能源和食品价格冲击，尤其是在欧洲。